

S-E-C-R-E-T

29 December 1967

MEMORANDUM TO: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the PNIOs

1. We have drafted new Priority National Intelligence Objectives for possible presentation by CIA to the USIB. In accordance with your instructions, the list is limited to those Objectives upon which our national survival depends, and is preceded by a new foreword defining the purpose and nature of the PNIOs more narrowly than has been customary.

2. The new draft is grounded in the following judgments:

a. The reason for reforming the PNIOs is not that they are necessary or even useful, but that it is easier to rewrite them than to abolish them. They might as well be abolished for all the practical difference they make, but to do so would require political maneuver of a scope and intensity which ought to be reserved for more crucial problems. In particular it would require personal and sustained attention by both the Chairman and the CIA member of the USIB beyond what the subject warrants.

b. At the same time it is important not to waste the talents of large numbers of senior officers in the vain repetitions and empty gestures which have characterized the community's handling of the PNIOs ever since 1954, when they began to destroy the meaning of priority by indiscriminate expansion of the list, and especially since 1963, when USIB decided to repeat part of the process every three months.

c. It follows, first, that the PNIOs should revive the sense of priority which characterized them until 1954. Our hope of accomplishing this lies not only in the narrow definition in terms of national survival but in a thoroughly literal-minded reminder of the purpose the NSC intended the PNIOs to have. Quotations from NSCID No. 1 are intended to emphasize that DCID No. 1/3 covers the narrow ground which NSCID No. 1 laid out for it, and no more -- i.e., general guidance for the production of national and other intelligence. This is an advance over earlier

S-E-C-R-E-T

3 JAN 1968

S-E-C-R-E-T

forewords which either claimed from the PNIOs a directive force they do not have, or apologized at tedious length for the lack of such directive force, or encouraged an impression that drawing up an imposing list was somehow equivalent to orderly management of requirements and allocation of assets to satisfy them.

d. It also follows that revision of the PNIOs should avoid that periodic scheduling which inevitably becomes perfunctory and stereotyped. Accordingly, we return both to the wording of NSCID No. 1 and to that which used to appear in the PNIOs: Revision should occur "from time to time." The old practice of putting the initiative for revision on the individual members of USIB is likely to insure much fresher and more thoughtful attention to the process than has now been the case for years.

3. With respect to the effort to use national survival as a criterion, we should make these observations:

a. We received much help in narrowing old definitions from the "Classification of Major U. S. Intelligence Objectives" published by the Critical Collection Problems Committee of USIB under date of 27 September 1967. This listing is of special interest to us for two reasons: (1) The CCPC found it possible to list more than two hundred intelligence objectives and yet label only six of them as "critical to U. S. national survival." The six did not include the Soviet ground forces, and to that degree is notably narrower than any PNIOs ever written including our own. (2) The fact that [REDACTED] task force included representatives from DIA and other parts of the community gives us some hope that our own narrow definition may become acceptable to the rest of the community as it now is inside CIA.

b. Our principal statement of the total military intelligence problem (Item Four) is comprehensive and general, not because it is impossible to define the national-survival aspects more precisely, but because it seemed necessary to recognize the political realities. A more exclusive, less compromising earlier draft struck a number of readers as guaranteed to cause maximum opposition.

c. Two of the five items (Three and Five) were constructed to emphasize the importance of other questions than those exclusively military matters which to many members of the community

- 2 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

would seem synonymous with national survival. Item Two is an attempt to distinguish the most crucial long-range aspect of the Vietnamese War without equating the North Vietnamese with the Soviets or Chinese or implying that what is most important about Vietnam now will also be the most important about it several years hence. It can be argued that Item Five is vague and not necessarily crucial; we find it useful, however, both because some such questions are ^{more} crucial than appears on the surface and because it is a reminder how much of our concern is other than exclusively military.

4. After an earlier look at the possibility of doing away altogether with short-range supplements to the PNIOs, as recommended in the IG Survey, we now propose that they be continued with certain important modifications. Our reasons are two:

a. A short-range supplement may in fact be more responsive to the total intention of NSCID No. 1 than our criterion of national survival. At any rate it can respond more clearly to the requirement that objectives be stated "on a current basis" and "with respect to specific countries."

b. Such a supplement, again revised on the initiative of any member of USIB and divorced from the stultification of periodic deadlines, should encourage broad and serious participation in the PNIO process, but at the same time attract attention to the value of keeping the supplement up to date without constant fiddling with the PNIOs themselves. Thus the basic purpose is again political: to encourage a sense of participation in keeping current a list of important subjects which should be much easier to devise than the fundamental PNIOs.

5. At the same time, our draft makes it clear that the subjects to be treated in the supplement are not PNIOs, Priority II; they are not PNIOs at all, but "Other Questions of Unusual Current Interest." Both the definition and the list are efforts to distinguish between the abiding and the transitory. In this context, the only Latin American country mentioned in the supplement is Panama -- not because it is necessarily the most important or critical to US interests, but because it is clear in advance that the fate of the Canal treaties will be one of the most crucial matters around the world for US policy in 1968. Similarly, the item which names Southeast Asia is meant to draw attention

- 3 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

to a matter of great current, short-range importance in addition to the long-range crucial matter which involves the same area in the PNIOs. The definition of subjects suitable for the supplement is intended to rule out (a) lists of predictions of crises to come; (b) secondary and tertiary etc. orders of priority, and (c) long lists of present and prospective anxieties.

6. In addition to dropping the periodic deadlines for revision, we believe that from now on the responsibility for reaching a CIA position on revisions should be broadened. We propose that whenever a revision is asked for by any member of USIB, or seems advisable to any office of CIA, the CIA position be formulated by representatives of the same senior officials who have been represented on this Ad Hoc Committee: that is, the DDI, the DDS&T, the DDP, the D/NIPE, and the D/ONE. But with one difference: It would be appropriate for such a committee to be chaired by the representative of the D/NIPE, as most familiar with the total intelligence activities of the community across the board. After the CIA position had been reached, it would be appropriate for the chairman to carry out such pre-USIB coordination as would be required, and again the Office of the D/NIPE would be an appropriate focus for such coordination, with whatever help from elsewhere in CIA might be useful.

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7. Meanwhile the attached draft has the general concurrence of the members of the present Ad Hoc Committee: [REDACTED] for ONE, [REDACTED] for DDI, [REDACTED] for DDS&T, [REDACTED] for DDP, and [REDACTED] for D/NIPE. This does not amount to complete and final coordination; for one thing, the three last items in the supplement have been added since our last meeting at the suggestion of [REDACTED] and Mr. Godfrey. The points treated in the foregoing report have also been discussed by the committee, most of them at some length, but this report itself has not been formally signed off. The committee felt that it would be useful to engage the collective attention of the senior officers we have been representing individually, and that to that end it might be useful to convene the Senior Executive Group in order to reach a final CIA position on the PNIOs.

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[REDACTED] Chairman
Ad Hoc Committee on PNIOs

- 4 -

S-E-C-R-E-T